“It’s better to be the hammer than the anvil.”
The events in the Middle East had already had a dramatic effect on the campaign in Algeria and Tunisia. With O’Connor stripped of both 7th and 1st Armored Divisions, as well as 50th Northumbrian Division, his ability to launch an attack capable of pushing through the multi-lined defenses of the Mareth position was neutralized. In effect, his presence at Mareth served only to compel the Germans to deploy several divisions of their own there to keep the back door to Tunisia firmly closed. To do this the Germans had to leave their 90th and 164th Light Divisions dug in on that line, backed by three Italian Divisions.
While Patton had stopped Operation Sturmflut with his brilliantly aggressive moves, he soon found himself suffering from the eventual dispersion of his forces. His six divisions were now reorganized into two operational corps. Patton had the 34th, and 1st Infantry Divisions, and 2nd Armored, and he kept his promise to Truscott, giving him command of 3rd and 9th Infantry, and the 1st Armored Division.
Truscott now would hold the center of the American position, which stretched from the vicinity of Souk Ahras, east through the highland country to Le Kef, and then touched Patton’s Corps around Bouz Aziz. The fiery commanding General had taken that place with CCA of his 2nd Armored Division, pronouncing it the gateway to Highway 4 to Tunis. Yet Patton had been unable to push on up that highway with just that single combat command at his disposal. The road there led through high mountains, and he would need infantry, which was well dispersed.
Patton’s lines stretched down west of the mountain passes on the Western Dorsal leading to Sibiba, Sbeitla and Kasserine, which were all still in German hands. CCA of 2nd Armored was still facing off against the bulk of 21st Panzer Division at Kasserine Pass, the 1st Infantry Division was deployed to screen and defend Tebessa, and the 34th was still in its defensive position well south astride the road leading to Ghafsa.
The American Army was now like a great wave that had rolled eastward, expanding in a wide crest as it went, until all its divisions were in line abreast, with no real reserve in hand to allow for a concerted offensive anywhere. The arrival of the 337th Division had done much to allow the Germans to stabilize their line in the center, and now Kesselring felt that he could finally hold.
As for Montgomery, he still had his 6th and 10th Armored Divisions trying to take Souk Ahras, but was foiled by the stubborn defense of the Hermann Goring Division and most of 10th Panzer. On the coast, he had forced the Germans to give up the port of Bone, but they had done so only to shorten their lines and consolidate their defense. Kesselring’s boast concerning Montgomery was true. Anything the British general could claim as a conquest had been given to him by the Germans. Try as he might, Monty could not make any further progress either.
Then the rains of late February and early March came in one deluge after another, and the roads became ribbons of mud. It was a stalemate, which was exactly what Kesselring had been trying to achieve, like a skillful chess player, knowing he could not beat his opponent, but playing for the draw. After of few weeks of inconsequential probing attacks and artillery duels along the line, a meeting was called by Eisenhower to assess the situation and see what could be done to get the offensives rolling again. Patton, Bradley and Montgomery were in attendance, and for the first time Patton had to voice the same complaint that had been on the lips of the Germans for so long.
“The front is now so broad that we’ve had to keep both armored divisions right on the line. I’ve got no Sunday Punch I can throw—nothing in reserve.”
“In one sense,” said Eisenhower, “that has also forced the Germans to spread out their panzer forces on defense as well. We know what they can do if they concentrate two or three of those divisions on the attack. Now it looks as though the Germans are playing defense.”
“And they’re damn good at it,” said Bradley. “Ike, we could use another infantry division or two. Then we could pull the two armored divisions off the line, and have something substantial in hand to pick one point on the German front and punch right through.”
“My thoughts exactly,” said Patton.
“Well gentlemen, you may just get your wish,” said Ike. “We’ve been training up Troy Middleton’s outfit for the Sicily operation, but if we don’t shake things loose here, that will never happen. So I’ve got authorization to move the 45th Infantry here to Algeria now, and I can also get you Matt Ridgeway’s 82nd.”
“An Airborne Division?” said Patton, with a dubious look on his face.
“It was training for Sicily as well,” said Eisenhower, so we got this crazy idea. Montgomery wanted that port at Bone, and it didn’t look like the Germans would give the place up. Well, he sent in two Commando units for an end around on the coast, and it shook things up. The Germans gave up the port and fell back to consolidate their lines. So we got to thinking about Ridgeway. We’ve got the transports, and we can protect them. What do you two think about an operation where we plop down the 82nd behind enemy lines—the whole damn division?”
There was a light in Patton’s eyes. “I like it, Ike,” he said quickly. It’s audacious, and I’ve always said that audacity was good for a first down if you put some guts behind it. You give me the 45th and I can pull the whole of 2nd Armored back. The 82nd will be out there like a good wide receiver, and then I’ll run the damn football with Hell on Wheels—right up the middle. You pick the spot, and I’ll gain ground for you. I’ll get you that touchdown.”
“Good enough,” said Eisenhower. “Let me show you what we have in mind.” He walked over to the map. “I’m sending in the 45th to Truscott so he can take over this segment of the line here, relieving all of 1st Armored and also CCB of 2nd Armored. George, both those divisions go back to you again, and I want you to move down here. There’s a secondary road through this narrow mountain spur northeast of Kasserine. That’s your axis of attack for 2nd Armored. Then I want Old Ironsides up here on this road to Sbeitla, which is right where we want to drop Ridgeway and the 82nd. He’ll cut the main road and rail to Kasserine, and if you can punch through these mountain passes quick enough, we’ll put both their 15th and 7th Panzers out of a job. What do you think?”
“It’ll be dangerous,” said Bradley. “We’ll have to make a night drop, and we’ll need clear weather. What do you think, George?”
“Magnificent. I wish I had thought of it. Then again, if I had Ridgeway and Middleton last month I might already be in Sbeitla, and then some.”
“I’m sure you would,” said Eisenhower. “The way we figure this is that if we can grab Sbeitla, the Germans will have to give up Kasserine, Thelepte, and probably Ghafsa right along with them. From Sbeitla, we could go right up this road towards the pass at Faid to threaten Sfax, or take Highway 3 northeast towards Kairouin and Sousse. We could cut the German position right in two.”
“Will we have enough to do the job?” asked Bradley.
“We’ll get a little help from the British. They’ll bring in an independent infantry brigade to relieve our 3rd Infantry on Monty’s right flank and allow Eddy to move it towards Le Kef. We figure that Truscott could then pose a credible threat in that sector, which will force the Germans to keep it well defended. That’s when we drop the 82nd and then you get rolling, General Patton. We want to kick this thing off by Saint Patty’s Day, so I’ll be moving a lot of new units in. We’re building out this command as 7th Army, and it’s all yours George. I can also give you two more Ranger Battalions, two independent tank battalions, a tank destroyer battalion and engineers, so you’ll have something in the cookie jar. And we’ll beef up the artillery with seven more battalions at the Army level. That’ll give you some clout for that breakthrough operation.”
Patton was elated. Just when things looked to be slowing down in the mud and rain, the promise of all these reinforcements, and an operation sanctioned by Eisenhower himself, buoyed his spirits. “Ike,” he said, “you’re a man after my own heart. But I’d like to make a little request if I might. You say there’s a couple armored battalions at the Army level? Well I’d like to mate them up with some armored infantry, and throw in some of that artillery to boot. That would create another independent combat command—a nice little running back that I can push through any hole we find in the enemy line, and I know exactly who I want for it—Creighton Abrams. If there any man who loves the armor like I do, its old Colonel Abe.”
“Abrams? Isn’t he with 4th Armored in the UK?”
“A damn waste of a good officer if he is. Let someone else do the training. I need men like Abrams here on the battlefield. Now, we’re rooting out the slackards. I don’t know what you decided to do with Fredendall, but now we’ve got our money on some really good numbers. Truscott is top notch and so is Harmon. You get me that infantry and Creighton Abrams, and I’ve got my A Team ready to roll. We’ll get to Sbeitla, and all the way to Faid Pass.”
“Alright, George,” said Eisenhower, “I’ll see if I can pull some strings.”
Patton would take the old “Blade Force” units that he had been using as a kind of armored cavalry unit, and then move in those two medium armored battalions, the 70th and 753rd. Then all he needed was some mechanized infantry, and Eisenhower would wheedle away the 10th Armored Infantry from 4th Armored in the UK and have them shipped over while the army waited out the rains. Patton found an engineer battalion, and he already had three new armored artillery battalions at the Army level with the newly arriving 5th Armored Artillery Group. When he rolled all that together, he had his new Combat Command, and Creighton Abrams was going to be the quarterback.
The only concern Eisenhower still expressed was whether the mechanized forces could get through those narrow mountain passes all along the Western Dorsal. “We’ve got good aerial photography of the whole area,” he said. “Job one is to get to Sibiba with a two-pronged attack. I want you to hit them from the north along this road through Rohia, and then hammer at them from the west on the road to Thala. Once we get Sibiba, a detachment can continue down Route 71 towards Sbeitla, and that will put them behind any German defense of Kasserine Pass. The main effort, however, will be to continue east, but that’s where I get worried.”
“Looks like some tough country that way,” said Bradley.
“It is. This big mountain spur here is impassible to armor, but there is a gap you can use between Ket el Amar and El Bechita.” He fingered the area on the map. “Now this northern spur here, Djebel Abiod, can be crossed by infantry if need be. The Hathob River flows north around that, and there are some tracks that could be passable to light armor.”
“Sounds like we’ll need infantry there,” said Patton. “I know I’ve robbed Truscott of 1st Armored again, but maybe I could talk him out of an RCT of the 45th Infantry. They could sweep that area and find routes for the armor.”
“I’ll see about that,” said Ike. “But getting that gap at El Amar will be the main thing. Once you get through there to El Bechita, you’ve got good open ground to the passes at Faid. There are two of them. See this long narrow ridge running north and south? This pass at the north end is called Sidi Faid. That’s the rail gap to Sousse. The one down south here is Faid proper, on the main road to Sfax.”
“Won’t we want Fondouk?” said Patton.
“If you can take that, all the better,” said Eisenhower. “Once we get through the Western Dorsal, we’ll have another meeting to discuss where we make our main thrust.” He looked directly at Patton when he said this. “And George, before you get to running off into the blue, I want to know about it.”
“Well hell,” said Patton. “Once you complete a good long pass, you don’t have your receiver stop and ask which way he ought to go. If we get to either port it’s a touchdown.”
“I understand what you’re saying, but you stay near a radio just the same.”
“Fair enough, Ike.”
“Alright, there’s a lot more that goes into this. We’re dredging the port at Philippeville so it can receive liberty ships there, and opening up Bone to receive supplies and equipment. Tank replacements for our forces will come in through Philippeville and load onto transporters to move to Tebessa. GQ thinks we can move over 90,000 tons through Philippeville this month. Beyond that, we’ve received a lot more rolling stock for the rail lines. We can move 40 trains per day now through Constantine, with 10,000 tons each. We also just received 4,500 new trucks through Casablanca and Oran, and we’ll get another 2000 per month from this point forward. That should keep you rolling, gentlemen, so have at ’em.”
It was a logistical base that would have had the Germans drooling. They barely had that many trucks scattered through all their divisions, and their use of the rail lines remained limited to available rolling stock, which was scant. This tremendous logistical advantage would be the real hammer that would smash the German defense in Tunisia, not Patton’s tanks, no matter how gallant and aggressive they were. The Allies could use even a minor port like Philippeville and move 90,000 tons through it, and this was vastly augmented by shipments to Oran and Algiers. By contrast, in the month of February, the Germans received no more than 25,000 tons through the much larger ports of Bizerte and Tunis, a shortfall of 55,000 tons.
“One more thing,” said Bradley. “Terry Allen’s 1st Infantry Division fights like hell when they get at the Germans, but otherwise they run around like drunken schoolboys. I’ve had complaints from every Mayor in Algeria, and when that division moved through Tebessa, they practically razed the whole damn city. Discipline starts at the top…” Bradley let that hang there, and Patton’s eyes narrowed with this, for he was fond of Allen’s fighting spirit, and Bradley hadn’t run this one by him before voicing it like this, right before Eisenhower.
“You’re asking me to replace Allen?” said Ike.
“I think we ought to take a look at that,” said Bradley.
“Now hold on here, Brad, we never discussed this.” Patton was quick into the ring on this one. “Allen’s got the kind of fire in the belly I need out here. He did a damn good job holding the line at Kasserine and Tebessa.”
“Right, and then they tore the place apart.”
“Come on Brad, it wasn’t that bad. Hell, I’ll personally see that anyone who suffered damage unrelated to combat gets full restitution. You’ve got to remember that fight was against Rommel, and two good Panzer Divisions.”
“Well those troops have more than fire in the belly,” said Bradley. “They’ll sniff out a bottle of whiskey better than a bloodhound could, and half the time they just run amok. I know Allen’s as good as they come, but he doesn’t train or drill those troops any more, and frankly, the whole damn division has a big fat chip on its shoulder.”
“Who would you want to replace Allen?” asked Eisenhower.
“What about Huebner? He’s a straight shooter, and a damn good soldier too.”
“George?” Eisenhower looked at Patton, always the diplomat.
“Ike, I think we should stay with Allen. I know that division has been a little loose, but when it counts, I can rely on those sons-of-bitches to get the job done. That’s all that matters. Now I’m not one to tolerate loose discipline, but I’ll admit I’ve given the 1st Infantry a lot of latitude. Tell you what…. I can put on my war paint and scowl with the best of them. What if I hash this out with Allen after this operation? You don’t whip a dog before you put him into a fight. Once this settles down, you give me a week or two and I’ll tighten things up with the Big Red 1. This isn’t the time to relieve a man like Allen, not on the eve of battle. What do you say, Brad?”
“George, you can scowl with the best of them, and if you think you can straighten that bunch out, be my guest. But if we do get to Tunis and Bizerte anytime soon, I don’t want 1st Infantry anywhere near them. I’d like to see both cities still standing when we get ready for the jump to Sicily.”
“Leave it to me,” said Patton, and Eisenhower deferred any change of command pending the outcome of this new operation. Patton was correct—changing the man at the top just before a fight wasn’t the best idea, but he privately took Bradley aside and told him he would consider what he asked.
No one knew it at the time, but this little affair was another small point of divergence, and one that would matter. Allen was supposed to go back to the States, get his face on the cover of Time Magazine in August of 1943, and then take command of the Fighting Timberwolves—the 104th Infantry, the following year. That unit would become one of the toughest and hardest fighting US divisions of the war. Allen would make sure they lived up to their motto: “Nothing can stop the Timberwolves!”
In this history, he would never meet them.
The plan Eisenhower had laid out was unorthodox and daring, though it was not where the Americans had hoped to attack in March. Their original plan had been to secure Ghafsa, El Guettar, and then to demonstrate to threaten Maknassay further east. It was Ryder’s meeting engagement with Rommel’s 15th Panzer Division that had unhinged plans on both sides. After that sharp check, Ryder’s 34th Infantry Division had taken up defensive positions and dug in, its advance on Ghafsa clearly not possible. But this had compelled Rommel to leave most of 15th Panzer there, while the rest of the division had to move south through Gafsa to stop the advance of the French.
With 7th Panzer near Thelepte, and most of 21st Panzer at Kasserine, those three divisions had formed a solid defense against any move of the kind initially anticipated. Stopped at Kasserine, it was Patton’s bold shift to the northeast in the effort to reach Bou Aziz that had set up the opportunity now to be pursued in Operation Hammer. That move had forced the Germans to cover all the passes through the Western Dorsal, and this task had fallen to the 21st Panzer Division while both 7th and 15th Panzers still remained to the south. None of those passes were strongly held, except Kasserine.
The main body of 21st Panzer remained at Kasserine Pass—four Panzergrenadier battalions and four companies of panzers. The closest pass was the Douleb Gap, about 25 kilometers NE of that force, manned by a company of pioneers and one panzer company. A similar force held further northeast at Sibiba, and the division recon and AT battalions held at Rohia, the pass closest to Bou Aziz. Once reconnaissance confirmed the passes were lightly held, Eisenhower saw his opportunity.
The lightning strike by the 82nd Airborne was debated by Eisenhower’s staff, and General Mark Clark. Some thought the risk too high, for the Germans still had potent fighter defenses, but the plan to surge Allied fighter support was laid in, and Eisenhower eventually opted to take the risk.
To prepare for the attack, the 34th Infantry was finally ordered to pull back and assume defensive positions screening Tebessa. This allowed Terry Allen, chastened by Patton, to deploy his 1st Division on the ridgeline opposite the Germans holding Kasserine. Allen was expected to attack that pass as part of the plan, with 1st Armored on the secondary road from Thala to the north, and Harmon’s 2nd Armored striking from Bou Aziz through the pass at Rohia.
All the American armor had been in reserve, largely deployed on the road that Patton had used to race for Bou Aziz, and all these passes connected to it. The element of surprise could therefore be maintained until the night of the attack, when the armor would leave their reserve positions and begin to move to the passes. The transports were positioned at airfields very close to the front, Tebessa, Les Bains, Le Kouf, each to embark one regiment of the 82nd. All the artillery would be lifted from further back at El Boughi. In all there would be 9 battalions of paras dropped, with one engineer battalion and two artillery battalions.
It would be the largest Allies airborne operation to date, a brief hop of no more than 100 kilometers from the nearest airfield at Tebessa, and the gamble would pay off handsomely. A few German fighters at the airfield east of Kasserine got up to cause a few problems, but they were quickly pounced on by the thick roving bands of Allied fighters. Ridgeway’s men largely got through intact, though three transports were shot down. Yet by dawn that day, the German supply hub at Sbeitla was completely surrounded by the 82nd Airborne Division. The only question now was whether Patton could get to them before the Germans could.
But the new man on the scene, Walther Nehring, was shocked by the reports coming in that morning. The first was a frantic radio call saying that there were American troops at Sbeitla. He assumed it was a commando raid, until the full scale of the attack was reported twenty minutes later. Then, when von Bismarck reported that all the passes on the Western Dorsal were under heavy attack, the situation became clear, and very disconcerting. Von Bismarck’s entire division was engaged, but there was no action at all in front of Funck’s 7th Panzer Division near Thelepte. So he immediately called to order a kampfgruppe assembled and sent to Sbeitla at once.
That would send a motorcycle recon battalion, one company of panzers down the road, through Kasserine and on to the airfield 15 kilometers northeast. There they ran into 3/509 Para battalion, which had landed and stormed that field in the predawn hours, shooting up several Stukas before the remaining planes could take off. A battery of SPG artillery and 1st Battalion of the 6th Panzergrenadiers was right behind those lead elements, and Ridgeway’s morning would start to heat up very soon.
Yet that move was nothing more and an expedient measure, the least Nehring could do given the shock and surprise of this attack. He was going to need something more than a kampfgruppe, and now the withdrawal of the US 34th Division would figure heavily in the outcome of this battle. It basically left 15th Panzer free in the south, and Nehring had already ordered it north the previous day, as the Italians had sent up the Littorio Division to keep an eye on the French southwest of Ghafsa.
One look at the map told the division commander, Heinz von Randow, what the Americans were planning. Randow, like von Bismarck in the 21st Panzer, was living a charmed life. Both men had lost their lives to land mines by this time in the war, but here, they were both still alive and well. Now he saw that he could take the main road through Kasserine, following the KG sent earlier, but instead, he shifted his division onto a secondary road that led due east from Thelepte. It would swing around a ragged mountain ridge and then approach Sbeitla from due south. That was where he wanted to make his counterattack.
No one had ordered him to do this, but the move was a typical example of how experienced German officers would exercise their own initiative and react with lightning quick reflexes in a crisis. If the Americans took the considerable risk of making this parachute attack on Sbeitla, then it was clear to Randow what they wanted to do. From that town, Highway 13 led directly to Faid Pass, continuing on to the coast at Sfax. Randow therefore wanted to interpose his division east of Sbeitla, astride that road, and also controlling the key junction at Kern’s Cross, where Highway 3 crossed Highway 13.
The American Army had built up like water behind a great dam, he thought. Those mountain passes through the Western Dorsal are the spillways, and if that dam breaks, then they can sweep right down the valley into the coastal plain. It is an audacious plan, one that Rommel would appreciate if he were here, and I know exactly how he would move to stop it. Everything will rest on my division at the outset. I must establish a good blocking position, and then get after those paratroopers. So I will send the Pioneers and a battalion of infantry down this road and up through Kern’s Cross to cover the easternmost flank. Von Funck is already moving up through Kasserine. It’s as good a plan as we can devise for now, but we will have to watch our left, particularly at Ghafsa.
One of the spillways had collapsed. The weight of Harmon’s 2nd Armored Division, had broken through the defense at Rohia, and now a torrent of mechanized wrath was flowing down the narrow river valley of the Hathob towards Sibiba. There the river would run almost due east and up over an arcing series of highland ridges again, a secondary levee that could become a very difficult obstacle. There was but one narrow gap in that wall of stony hills, at a place called Ket el Amar, which was being defended by the Recon Battalion of 21st Panzer.
The Americans brought up engineers to cross the river to the southern bank, and began to organize an attack with a company of engineers, armored cav backed by Shermans. At the same time, the 157th RCT had found a track leading east north of the river where it flowed above the easternmost portion of the ridgeline, Jebel Abiod. It would be tough going, through that narrow river gorge flanked by the ridge to the south, and heavy woodland to the north, but if they could get east that way, they would eventually reach Highway 3 where it ran southwest from Fondouk towards Sbeitla. They would be joined by 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions under Colonel Darby, the best scouts they might have.
The torrent pressed relentlessly on when Sibiba fell and the scant German defense there retreated south. CCA of 1st Armored pursued them aggressively, while CCB kept hammering its way through the Douleb Gap. Tanks would push through there, hastening along the narrow road that led down onto the valley floor. They would arrive just in time to support the hard pressed men of the 82nd Airborne, now under attack by a KG from 7th Panzer from the west, and Randow’s 15th Panzer from the south.
The plan was working.
By the 17th of March, the Americans had all the passes through the Western Dorsal except Kasserine, moving south and east, engaging any Germans they encountered, and flowing around these boulders in the flood, hell bent for Patton’s stated objecting—Highway 3. When the General received news that 2/82nd Recon had reached the gap at Ket el Amar, he could smell the victory he was after here, and ordered the special reserve Combat Command under Abrams to follow 2nd Armored.
Von Bismarck was at the town of Kasserine when he learned the Americans were now well behind his position at the pass as they pushed down from the Douleb Gap and Sibiba. The KG that von Funck had sent was already dueling with tanks that were now moving to support the American paratroopers. Reports were scattered and sometimes fragmented, but a shot up Luftwaffe fighter soon landed at the airfield at Thelepte, reporting to von Funck there, and he was quickly on the phone to von Bismarck.
“My front is stable,” he said “but the Luftwaffe says there is a massive enemy column up at Ket el Amar! It stretches all the way back to Bou Aziz! Can you stop it?”
“Stop it?” said von Bismarck. “Most of my division is at Kasserine Pass. I’ve only got the recon battalion left up that far north, and it’s trying to fight its way out of that gap even now.”
“Look… This is serious,” said von Funck. “Randow is moving his division up south of Sbeitla. He’s trying to set up a defense east of that town, and I think that is where we need to be now. Unfortunately, that damn American Airborne Division is blocking your retreat through Sbeitla. If you try to take the direct route, you’ll be fighting on three sides the whole way. I think you should fall back through Kasserine, and then come south to Thelepte. We can then follow the route Randow used and take the secondary road east through Bir el Hafey on Highway 3. And we have to move fast! If Randow can’t deal with the situation, the American’s will push all the way to Faid Pass.”
“Does Nehring know about this?”
“He must know something, but I only just learned of that big enemy column a moment ago, and right from the Luftwaffe pilot who flew that recon mission. I’ll see if I can get to Nehring and inform him, but we had better move now. I’ll need to recall my Kampfgruppe, so move quickly.”
“This is a big move… It will mean we give everything up west of Sbeitla. What about the Italians?”
“I’m ordering them to Ghafsa.”
“You are ordering them? What about Nehring?”
“I’ll confirm all this with him soon enough. Just get moving!”
Von Funck hung up the line, realizing that he was taking a risk by precipitating this general retreat, but he instinctively knew that he could no longer hold where he was, airfields or no airfields. This was time to maneuver, not sit on objectives. He pulled on his gloves, grabbed his map satchel, and walked briskly out the door to give the orders that would set the rest of his division in motion. There were three Luftwaffe squadrons providing most of the close support at the two airfields flanking Thelepte, and he told a staff officer to get word to them immediately.
It was a big move, the artillery going first before the front line troops. He was gratified later when the first dusty columns of von Bismarck’s troops began to arrive from Kasserine pass. He would order the KG he sent north to act as a rear guard delaying force astride the main road. Otherwise it was up to the fine art of German mobile finesse to carry off this move, a lightning quick redeployment to the east, and on a moment’s notice.
Von Funck found a Kubelwagon and collared a driver. We could have held Kasserine and Thelepte indefinitely, he thought. But this attack over a hundred kilometers to the north has just taken them both. These Americans are smarter than we realized, bolder, more aggressive than anyone at OKW ever thought they could be. General Patton must be behind all this. There will have to be a day of reckoning with that man. He beat Rommel at his own game, putting on quite a show, and now this attack has our entire Korps running for the exits!
Nehring was at the other airfield, but as von Funck started east, he saw him come riding up in another staff car. “What is happening?” he said, clearly upset.
Von Funck related everything he had learned, and told him how he advised von Bismarck.
“You ordered all this on your own initiative?”
“Someone had to act. Time is of the essence in a matter like this.”
“My God! Are those von Bismarck’s troops? Very well, Herr General. You can write the report to Kesselring tonight. Understand? And when Hitler finds out that we just handed the Americans Kasserine and Thelepte, it will be your name on the order!”
He drove off, also heading east on that same road, and von Funck gave the man a half sneer as he went. Where were you when I was running with Rommel to the French coast, he thought? Yet Nehring’s threat frightened him more than the Americans ever could. He was not in Hitler’s good graces—in fact the Führer had a particular dislike for von Funck. He had served as adjutant under another man who had fallen out of favor, Werner von Fritsch, and he later went to Spain as a liaison to Franco. Hitler seems to have painted von Funck with the same distaste he had for the Spanish leader, and barely tolerated him, only because he was said to be a highly skilled officer.
So it was that the shift first initiated by General Randow to get east of Sbeitla, now became a general retreat of the entire southern front. Von Funck’s timely order may have been in the interest of trying to save the front line in central and southern Tunisia, but he would end up trading his career in the army for his impetuous initiative when Hitler found out what had happened. While German forces advanced everywhere else, in Iraq and the Caucasus, the report that von Funck had retreated from Kasserine, leaving the place unfought, sent the Führer into a rage. The General was recalled to Germany the following week, and OKW sent another man to Tunisia to lead the 7th Panzer Division. His name was Generalmajor Hasso von Manteuffel.
The crisis precipitated by Operation Hammer was now going to force a most uncomfortable decision upon the German defenders in Tunisia. Kesselring called a meeting with von Arnim and Nehring to discuss the situation, knowing the inevitable before he even opened his mouth. The other two men knew it as well.
“We simply cannot defend this way,” said Nehring, the man on the spot now that it was his forces giving up ground in the south. “I’ve been able to establish a new line, but the panzer divisions are holding fronts over 30 kilometers each. I would want them holding half that—in fact, I would prefer they weren’t on the line at all, held in reserve to counterpunch.”
“We both know that isn’t possible here,” said Kesselring. “We have only four infantry divisions worth the name north of the Mareth Position. Two hold the north coast, and two hold the position between Souk Ahras and Bou Aziz. Luckily, that has been the quiet sector.”
“Yes,” said Nehring. “But the Americans are throwing all their armor on this one segment of the line after taking Sbeitla. That airborne drop was quite a gamble, but they broke through the Western Dorsal passes to link up. Now they want the pass at Faid.”
“Can you hold them?” Kesselring eyed the map.
“For a time, but it is slowly wearing out these mobile divisions Rommel was kind enough to leave me. Meanwhile, O’Connor is pounding away down south at Mareth. How long will that position hold?”
“It should be able to hold indefinitely,” said Kesselring. “That’s where all the rest of our infantry is, two German and four Italian divisions. The question is, should we leave them there? We have already had to pull out the Littorio Armored Division to help cover Ghafsa, and the Italians have sent some of their San Marco Marines west as well.”
“Ghafsa?” said Nehring. “Why in God’s name do we need that? It made sense to hold it for Sturmflut, but no longer.”
“Ghafsa covers Highway 15 to Sfax,” said Kesselring. “And that port receives Siebel ferry boats out of Tunis to help supply the Mareth line position.”
Nehring shook his head. “I do not wish to sound like a defeatist, as some have already accused me of this back home, but we don’t need Mareth either. If I had my way, I would draw the line right here.” He fingered the northernmost point of Patton’s operation, and moved it due west to the coast—right at the port of Sousse.
Kesselring nodded. “I came to that conclusion three days ago. I just wanted to see if either of you would suggest the same thing. Von Arnim?”
“Nehring is correct,” he said. “His entire position is holding a front simply to deny the enemy terrain—all of southern Tunisia. If we gave that up, and moved to the line he suggests, then we shorten our entire defensive front here into a much tighter bridgehead, and one we actually have a chance at holding.”
Kesselring smiled. “I hope you both realize that I was recently directed to begin planning another spring offensive for April.”
Nehring actually laughed this time. “Out of the question,” he said. “At least as long as we are trying to hold our present positions. If we were to pull out to the line I described, then we could also get the Panzer divisions off the line and ready for such an offensive. As it stands, this is impossible.”
“Now we come to the real problem with all of this thinking,” said Kesselring, and he summed it up in one word. “Hitler.”
Von Arnim nodded agreement. “He just sent the 16th Panzer Division to Rommel so he can muddle about with it in Syria,” he said with obvious bitterness. And I can tell you that he will not permit the withdrawal Nehring suggests.”
“But what if the three of us all sign on to this demand?” Nehring pressed his point. “I’ll tell you right now—if this Patton breaks through up near Faid, then that withdrawal will become a necessity. Quite frankly, if we don’t move as I suggest, they will cut us right in half. I’ll end up having to split my panzers into two groups, with the15th and 7th trying to screen off Sfax and points south, and the 21st trying to hold that line I suggested. The problem will then be the fact that we will lose overland road and rail connections to the southern pocket. Everything will have to go by sea into Sfax and Gabes. It will be a disaster.”
“Agreed,” said Kesselring. “So how can we do what we all know we must, and without losing our heads in the process? You saw what happened to von Funck.”
They passed a moment of silence before von Arnim finally spoke. “The Italians,” he said quietly, a conspiratorial tone in his voice. “Nehring has put his finger on the right spot. We must prevent an enemy breakthrough to the coast through Faid Pass. Hitler chooses to feed Rommel in Syria. So be it. We need infantry, and we have two good divisions sitting on the Mareth line. So I see no alternative other than to recall them to stop this new American offensive.”
“But the Italians won’t be able to hold O’Connor,” said Kesselring.
“Precisely.” Von Arnim just looked at them, saying nothing more, and they both knew what he meant. The Italians would not hold. They would be forced back, and the Germans would have their scapegoat. All they had to do was pull the two German infantry divisions from Mareth, and the rest would be inevitable. The Allies would eventually force the Italians back, and they would have no recourse other than to reach the line Nehring suggested.
“I can see the look on the face of General Meese right now when I tell him I must issue orders for the 90th and 164th to move north.”
“We have coddled them for years,” said von Arnim. “They were all but beaten by O’Connor in Libya until we sent Rommel over. Now they’ve been moaning and groaning about the loss of Libya, so we promised them Tunisia. Well—let them hold it. Where are the divisions Mussolini promised us? He sent us half the Centauro Armored Division, a parachute outfit and a few battalions of Marines.”
“The Giovani Fascisti has just been moved out of reserve to Sfax,” said Kesselring, “but I don’t think we’ll see them shipping over any more armor, for what it’s worth.”
“Then tell General Meese to send that division to Mareth,” said Nehring. We must get another German infantry division up here, and right now. “I don’t intend to leave 15th Panzer Division where it is now either. I need it to stop the main enemy offensive. They are just screening it off with infantry, so I want to move it north. After that, let the chips fall as they may.”
“You won’t have von Funck to blame this time,” said Kesselring.
“To hell with that,” said Nehring. “If I don’t move it, Patton will break through somewhere along this 100-kilometer front and then we’ll be to blame instead of the Italians, because that will force us to give up all of southern Tunisia. I agree with von Arnim. We should pull our troops out of Mareth, and let the Italians hold. If nothing else, they can at least fight a delaying action there. They could fall back to Gabes, hold there a while, and then move north. But they should not try to hold Ghasfa any longer, it’s out there on a limb, and if they do get more than a French division pressing them, it will fall in a few days anyway.”
So that was to be the German plan, a nice little conspiracy to pull their infantry from Mareth and then blame the loss of Southern Tunisia on the Italians. Hitler could rant all he wanted, but he would have only that one complaint to put against Kesselring—why did he withdraw German troops from Mareth? Smiling Al already had his answer—because it was a military necessity in order to prevent the entire position from being cut in two. If that were to happen, and two bridgeheads formed, he wanted no German troops trapped in the south.
After linking up with the 82nd airborne at Sbeitla, Patton had pushed his combat commands hard. The 82nd had now pushed as far as Kern’s Cross, supported by companies of Tank Destroyers. North of that position, all of Ward’s 1st Armored Division was attacking up the rail line and Highway 3 towards Fondouk. In fact, the entire American line now extended parallel to that highway, just a few kilometers west. Patton already had elements of the 157th RCT from 45th Infantry seven klicks from Fondouk, but that force had run into German Tiger tanks to block their advance. Kesselring had been moving the few Schwere companies he had about like war elephants, and two had been sent to prevent the fall of Fondouk.
From there all the way south to Ward’s division, Patton was keeping up relentless pressure. Just north of Ward he had Task Force Abrams at El Tarig, and then came Harmon’s entire 2nd Armored division. Virtually every tank the Americans had in theater was involved, at least 600 Shermans, another 150 M5s and scores of Tank Destroyers, the new American M-10. It was like water behind a dam, and slowly, he was wearing down the German defense.
To make matters worse, the other two regiments of the US 45 Division had pushed up Highway 4 from Bou Aziz and taken the mountain town of Maktar. That had been the redoubt held by KG Huder, along with an independent infantry battalion, but they simply could not hold against two full regiments. This left a massive gap in the German line between Maktar and Fondouk, a distance of some 60 kilometers, and it was now screened by only three battalions.
The Germans were in desperate need of infantry.
The 164th Light had been relieved on the Mareth line by the Italian 80th La Spezia Airmobile Division, and it was the first to board the trains just north of Gabes. It would hasten north through Sfax, then turn northwest on the rail line running parallel to Highway 13, bound for Faid Pass. The armor was defending the lowland, but infantry was needed to hold the thin ridge that jutted north from Faid like a stony sword. The stronger 90th Light would be right behind it, but this would still leave nothing for that gap between Maktar and Fondouk.
At his wits end, Kesselring gave orders for the 20th and 24th Marsch Battalions to move from their positions on the northern coast. He would attempt to throw together a Kampfgruppe, ordering the Tigers on the line with the 337th Infantry to move to Maktar, and then bringing up that infantry in support. There was no place on the front that was not under some pressure, and in need of reserves that simply were not there. Nehring is correct, he knew. We should get everything back into one bridgehead in the north. Then I can call it Festung Tunis. Hitler will like that.
The Axis forces had now created two armies. Kesselring commanded 5th Panzer Army in the north, and Meese had the 1st Italian Army in the south. As the Germans predicted, the Italians had no plans to try and hold Ghafsa without direct German support. They immediately began pulling back, with one group passing through the defile at El Guettar, and another screening the secondary roads to the north of the mountain ridges in that region. The rail line ran east to Maknassi above this terrain, and the Superga Mountain Division was holding in that sector.
Without those two German infantry Divisions, the line at Mareth came under increasing pressure. O’Connor saw the German troops pull out, and then quickly ordered up the 4th Indian to back up the units he already had forward on the line. Now he reasoned that he could mass 23rd Armored Brigade and simply break through, and he was correct. Trento Motorized Division had already abandoned its positions on the high country to the west and it was motoring north, ostensibly to support the Italian positions there. The remaining three Italian divisions would not hold long. Which would soon lead to a general withdrawal towards Gabes.
In Patton’s sector, 82nd Airborne was on the road from Kern’s Cross, coming right for that town when they encountered a kampfgruppe from 15th Panzer near Lessouda. Both sides quickly started an artillery duel while Ridgeway sent out patrols to try and gauge the strength of the defense. It was found to be a full battalion of Panzergrenadiers, backed by tanks, a pioneer company, and artillery in Faid Pass. Behind it, on the first trains to arrive from Mareth, the 164th Light infantry had finally arrived. US aerial recon saw them along Highway 13, and photographed many more troops and vehicles behind the long north to south ridge line that connected Faid in the south with Sidi Faid in the north. This barrier stretched for some 30 kilometers, the last bulwark of defense before the Allies would reach the coastal plain.
The Germans had finally concentrated. Those troops were the bulk of von Bismarck’s 21st Panzer Division, with von Manteuffel’s 7th Panzer to their north holding around Sidi Faid. Patton came riding up the road along Highway 3 and came upon Task Force Abrams at El Tarig a little over 15 kilometers behind the front lines.
“Abe, what’s your situation?”
“There’s no room on the line,” said Abrams. “So Harmon told me to wait here in reserve.”
“No room?”
“Yes sir. They’ve got both 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions side by side, and things are packed in tighter than sardines in a tin. I’ve got to radio Harmon just to get permission to move east on this road.”
Patton nodded. Harmon knew what he was doing, and just looking around, he could already see the great mass of service vehicles, munitions and fuel trucks, artillery carriers and other vehicles cluttering up this rear area. But there was Abrams, as good a cavalry officer with the armor and they came, and he was just sitting. In fact, the advance thus far had been so restricted that his troops had fought only one brief engagement. He looked at his map.
“Abe,” he said. “I may have another job for you. Are your boys fueled up and ready to roll?”
“Yes sir, we’ve just been sitting here.”
“Alright, here’s what I want you to do. Middleton has two RCTs of the 45th up here, and he just took Maktar. There’s a big hole in the German lines up that way, but now the Germans are trying to plug it with some of their heavy armor—Tigers. Middleton asked me for tank support this morning, and you’ve got the job. So I want you to move back the way you came through Ket el Amar to Sibiba, and then take Route 71 north through Bou Aziz. That’s where you hang a right on Highway 4 to Maktar. Got that?”
“Yes sir. We can move right away.”
“Outstanding. I’ll square things with Harmon. You just get your tanks rolling and when you get there, give the bastards hell.”
Abrams saluted, and he was on his way.
The entire battle was becoming fluid in many places now, yet the main effort of Patton’s attack was encountering increasing difficulties. The Germans were now concentrating their three Panzer Divisions on defense near Faid, and that pass would not be taken easily. To make matters worse, the rains were bringing more misery and mud.
Patton’s order to Abrams was going to heavily reinforce the effort along Highway 4, into the weakest sector of the German position. But Abrams learned that if he moved east, along a road skirting the flanks of Djebel Kessera, that he could then push into the Ousseltia Valley, towards the Karachoum Gap and eventually Highway 3. It was a game changer that would compel the Germans to abandon their defense at Faid Pass and move rapidly north.
It would also mean that most of Southern Tunisia would simply have to be abandoned, and the Italians clearly perceived their peril, making rapid withdrawals from Gabes behind a thin rearguard. Germany had promised them Tunisia to compensate for the loss of Libya, then summarily gave them all of Southern Tunisia, but they could not hold it alone.
These developments saw the gravity of the battle shifting north. Hitler would learn of the withdrawal to Gabes, the loss of Ghafsa, the battle shifting to Faid Pass, and he was predictably angered by the situation. Yet von Arnim’s ploy would work. Kesselring would simply send a message indicating command in the south had passed to the Italian 1st Army, and that it was the Italians who ordered the withdrawals. His forces were now concentrating to secure the main bridgehead in the north, and little by little, the Allies were creeping ever closer to their old historical rendezvous with the Germans at Tunis in May of 1943.